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I. INTRODUCTION
A hundred years. before Grotius wrote his classic on international
law, De iure belli ac pacis, Vitoria and Suarez had revived the concept of
jus gentium to meet the exigencies of colonization of the New World.
These two Spanish theologians appealed to the human conscience. Speak-
ing of the significance of Vitoria's ideas with regard to international law,
J. L. Brierly says:
Vitoria's teaching marks an important expansion of interna-
tional law into a world system; for it meant that a law which
had its rise among the few princes of Christendom was not to be
limited to them or to their relations with one another but was
universally valid, founded as it was on a natural law applying
equally to all men everywhere.'
The Latin American judges of the International Court of Justice
cling to this Hispanic international legal tradition and attribute to it their
unique awareness of keeping international law in stride with contempo-
rary developments in international society. From 1946 to 1964 Latin
Americans held four of the fifteen seats on the Court.
The discovery of the New World may be considered as comparable
to problems connected with Antarctica and outer space. The growth of
generally accepted custom today is further complicated by the difference
"between Soviet doctrine and that of the Western countries . . .[giving]
striking evidence of the absence of any community of law."' A lack of a
community of law prompted Vitoria to turn to natural law and general
consent:
And, indeed, there are many things in this connection which
issue from the law of nations, which, because it has a sufficient
* Assistant Professor of Government, Louisiana State University in New Orleans.
1. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS (6th ed. 1963). The dates of the two Spanish
theologians are Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546), and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617).
2. CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 155
(P. Corbett transl. 1957).
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derivation from natural law, is clearly capable of conferring
rights and creating obligations. And even if we grant that it is
not always derived from natural law, yet there exists clearly
enough a consensus of the greater part of the whole world,
especially in behalf of the common good of all.'
The constant references to the writings of Vitoria and Suarez by the Latin
American judges provide the first base for regional particularism; the
second is provided in the affinity of nations in the Western Hemisphere.
II. AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Perhaps the most influential and articulate of the Latin American
judges who appeals to the hemispheric history of international law is
Alejandro Alvarez. His persistence in interjecting the term "American
international law" in his individual and dissenting opinions puts him
among the jurists who argue for the existence of an ideal combination of
the legal systems of Latin America and the United States. Regional par-
ticularism becomes a topic of debate in international jurisprudence be-
cause the supporters of universalism in international law deny the exist-
ence of "American international law" and other forms of particularism.
The term "Pan-Americanism" signifies an inclination toward cooper-
ation among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. This sense of inter-
connection has been attributed to several factors including (1) isolation
from European affairs; (2) a common history of revolution against
colonial domination and a dedication to democracy; (3) close commercial
relations with each other; and (4) inter-American cooperation for pur-
poses of security and improvement of socio-economic conditions.4 In 1948
at the Bogota Conference the Charter of the Organization of American
States was adopted, thus institutionalizing a regional system which had
been periodically functioning since 1826 when Simon Bolivar called the
first Pan-American Conference. The close collaboration of the American
states in matters of defense facilitated the establishment of the Organiza-
tion of American States under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
as a regional system of self-defense. The integrative aspects of the organi-
zation have gone beyond defense into such areas as hemispheric economic,
political, social and technical problems, and intellectual and cultural
exchange.
The Inter-American conferences of the last century have dealt with
many topics of international law, but have focused upon the fundamental
rights and duties of states and governments, domestic jurisdiction, obliga-
tions of territorial jurisdiction, the regime of territorial waters, pacific
3. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, RELECTIONES DE INDIS: THE CATHOLIC CONCEPTION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 489-90 (J. Scott transl. 1934).
4. See J. Rn'py, GLOBE AND HEMISPHERE (1958); A. WHITAKER, THE WESTERN HEMI-
SPHERE IDEA: ITS RISE AND DECLINE (1954).
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settlement of international disputes, right of asylum, state responsibility,
and arbitral procedure.' The declarations and resolutions of the Inter-
American meetings express a regional emphasis and unique interpretation
of these international law subjects. The existence of such precedents has
led many Latin American jurists, most notably Alvarez, to assert that a
body of American international law has been created by the declarations
and resolutions of the Pan-American conferences, as well as by the
writings of Latin American and United States legal scholars.
Alvarez bases his theory of "American international law" on the
synthesis of two separate legal traditions which are present in the Western
Hemisphere-the Anglo-Saxon legal system of the United States, and the
Latin legal system of the Latin American nations. Ideally, "American in-
ternational law" combines the best points of the two systems. "American
international law" had its beginning in the Monroe doctrine and the
political hegemony of the United States over the hemisphere. Alvarez
justifies both the Monroe Doctrine and its application as a source of
"American international law":
Hegemony, as well as the Monroe Doctrine, has been opposed
as not having a solid base in international law. Both must be
considered together since they are the known and respected lines
of conduct of nations and in spite of the exceptions which have
arisen, have received constant application, and have force at
their disposition.'
Although to Alvarez the hegemony of the United States is objection-
able, especially in connection with the frequent unilateral interventions of
the "Big Stick" era, it has served to isolate the hemisphere from Euro-
pean politics.
Alvarez describes the Monroe Doctrine as the theoretical source of
"American international law":
In so far as American public international law is concerned it is
contained in the three declarations of President Monroe-to
maintain independence, no colonization, and no intervention of
European powers in American countries. These principles syn-
thesize the views of all the American states, not those of the
United States alone, as has been erroneously believed.7
Thus the transition from unilateral to multilateral interpretation of the
Monroe Doctrine has produced through a long history of Pan-American
consultations a process which brought about the establishment of a body
of distinctive American international law. This multilateral interpretation
5. These topics were selected from a list selected by the International Law Commission
in 44 Am. J. INT'L L. 5-6 (1950).
6. A. ALVAREZ, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL AMERICAIN 179 (1910).
7. A. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATED SUBJECTS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW
OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT 37 (1922).
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of the Monroe Doctrine by both the United States and Latin American
countries is often referred to as the collectivization of the Monroe Doc-
trine.
Alvarez holds that almost the entire history of the Western Hemi-
sphere is characterized by an absence of serious conflicts of interest such
as those which were present in Europe. The test of solidarity is this peace-
ful and cooperative growth of the American nations. The immigrants who
came to America relinquished their old ties based upon the international
law principle of jus sanguinis, and became citizens of the new nations
under the Pan-American espoused principle of jus soli. The geographically
isolated situation of the Western Hemisphere allowed Latin American
jurists to concentrate upon principles of international law which had
special application to the region.
One would expect to observe differences among judges on interna-
tional tribunals from various regions. The late Hersch Lauterpacht saw
no obvious divergences between the Anglo-American and Continental
jurists on the Court however, and did not admit the existence of a distinct
American international law. He writes: "On no occasion has there taken
place an alignment of the Anglo-American element on the bench against
the judges trained in the Continental tradition."' Lauterpacht like many
jurists from the United States and Britain considers the Latin American
international lawyers to belong to the Continental tradition. It is likely
that any distinction between Continental and Latin American interna-
tional jurisprudence is overlooked because there is a feeling that the con-
tributions of Latin Americans to the study of international law are not
significant enough to merit such a distinction.
To the contrary, Alvarez and others recognize the existence of a
European international law and the gradual formation of an Asian inter-
national law. In the Colombian Peruvian Asylum case he stated that the
three continental systems of international law "are not subordinated to
universal law, but correlated to it." He goes on to explain his position in
the following passage:
American international law has exercised a considerable influ-
ence over universal international law and has given it its pecu-
liar character; many concepts or doctrines of American origin
have achieved or tend to achieve universal acceptance and many
concepts of a universal nature have, or tend to have, a special
application in the New World. The influence of that has in-
creased since the last war. The number and especially the
quality of the institutions and principles which tend to be in-
corporated in new international law is truly impressive.9
8. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 128'(1958).
9. Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, [19501 I.C.J. 266 at 294 (dissenting opinion).
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In considering Alvarez' statement, emphasis should be placed on two
terms; namely, the "New World" and "new international law."' 0 It would
seem that the use of the name "New World" is completely outdated. Al-
varez uses the expression "New World" to strengthen his argument for
an American international law, manifesting a special insight on the part
of Latin Americans who are attempting to cope with challenges facing
contemporary international law, in much the same fashion as did Vitoria
and Suarez. He holds that the international environment has undergone
sweeping changes due to the world wars, the development of trade, indus-
try, and communications, and the creation of international and regional
organizations. Perhaps the most influential element of change is the moral
force of international public opinion. Never before in the history of man-
kind has the body of international law been exposed to so many pres-
sures.
11
For a long time Alvarez had been building up a theory of "the new
international law" in his writings, but he did not clearly formulate the
theory until he became a member of the International Court of Justice.
The core of his theory is divided into two components: a negative requi-
site of the limitation of sovereignty of nations, and a positive requirement
of the responsible participation of states in constructing a solid interna-
tional community. The real test of the theory is the success or failure of
international organization. Thus the main concern of Alvarez' discussion
of the new international law is the United Nations and its organs, espe-
cially the International Court of Justice.
Judge Alvarez has given special attention to the Court's dual task of
deciding cases according to established international law and of develop-
ing international law by adapting it to the changes in international soci-
ety. Thus the constructive role of the Court includes both modification of
existing law and the creation of new law. In his dissenting opinion in the
case of the Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Alvarez wrote
the following:
As a result of the great changes in international life that have
taken place since the last social cataclysm, it is necessary that
the Court should determine the present state of law in each case
which is brought before it and, when needed, act constructively
in this respect ... ; it is at liberty to develop international law,
and indeed to create law, if that is necessary, for it is impossible
to define exactly where the development of this law ends and its
creation begins. 2
Thus, according to Alvarez, the new international law is an outgrowth of
a regional attitude toward the development of international law.
10. Novus Mundus or "New World" was used by Vitoria and Suarez in their writings.
11. A. ALVAREZ, supra note 7.
12. Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1949] I.C.J.
Reports 50.
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It is necessary to scrutinize Alvarez' opinions on the matter of
regional particularism because he submits a theory which goes far beyond
the general expression of regionalism on the part of the other Latin Amer-
ican judges.' 8 As far back as 1910 he published a book entitled Le Droit
International Americain.14 As a member of the Court he is permitted to
show how his ideas on international law differ from those of the judges of
other nationalities.
While Alvarez stands out when the problem of regionalism versus
universalism arises before the Court, it would be well at this point to turn
to the opinions of other Latin American judges concerning the same mat-
ter. On at least two occasions in his individual opinions the Argentine
judge Lucio Moreno Quintana refers to a hemispheric system of inter-
national law. Inasmuch as territorial disputes have been prevalent
throughout the history of Latin America, Judge Moreno Quintana in the
case involving a boundary controversy between Cambodia and Thailand
dissented and turned to a regional interpretation of the points of law: "In
American international law questions of territorial sovereignty have, for
historical reasons, a place of cardinal importance. That is why I could not,
as a representative of a legal system, depart from it."'15 In the case of
Honduras v. Nicaragua, he made the following declaration:
As a representative on this Court of a Spanish-American legal
system and confronted with a dispute between two Spanish-
American States, I believe that the legal questions which are of
particular concern to them should have been dealt with in the
first place.'
These two statements are evidence of assertions of individuality through
an appeal in the content of the law of an area. They show a firm belief in
the existence of such law, and a conviction that it can have universal
applicability.
Judge Azevedo while commenting on the Haya de la Torre case takes
a different tack in that he excludes the United States from the region. It
is quite apparent that the United States has not gone along with Latin
Americans in giving a great amount of flexibility to rules on diplomatic
asylum; Azevedo stated:
Diplomatic asylum is a striking example of the necessity of
taking into account-in the creation or adaptation of rules of re-
stricted territorial scope-of geographical, historical and politi-
13. Samore, The New International Law of Alejandro Alvarez, 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 41-54
(1958).
14. A. ALVAREZ, LE Daorr INTERNATIONAL AMERICAIN, supra note 6.
15. Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [19621
I.C.J. 6.
16. Case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December
1906, [19601 I.C.I[. 192,
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cal circumstances which are peculiar to the region concerned-
in this case the twenty nations of Latin America.1
7
The statement undermines Alvarez' premise that the Monroe Doctrine is
the foundation of American international law. This position throws the
United States back into the category of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
In the same case the dissenting opinion of Judge Caicedo Castilla,
which does not mention the United States but at the same time uses the
phrase "American international law," complicates the issue. He explains
it this way:
An obvious conclusion may be drawn from the preceding con-
siderations: in studying the problems of diplomatic asylum and
in reaching a decision, account must be taken of the Latin Amer-
ican spirit and environment, as well as of the special interpreta-
tion of American international law regarding asylum, which is
very different from the European interpretation. 8
Obviously Caicedo Castilla was speaking of an environment of political
instability discernable in Latin America. This would automatically pre-
clude the United States jurists from having the same sensitivity about
diplomatic asylum for political leaders.
Although the United States has not aligned itself with Latin Ameri-
can states on the matter of diplomatic asylum, Alvarez in the Haya de la
Torre case insisted upon explaining his theory of the blend of North and
South American international law, he finally wrote: "American interna-
tional law has its sub-divisions, such as, for instance, Latin American in-
ternational law or the law of the Latin Republics of the New World which
is not binding upon the United States."' 9
Whether this is a satisfactory explanation is doubted by many com-
mentators on this highly controversial case. John A. Houston says that
"the net effect of the various judgments of the Court in this case has been
to weaken the claim of the Latin Americans that they possess a regional
system of international law which has evolved in response to regional
needs." 2
A final example of a defense of regional particularism may be seen
in the separate opinion of Judge Alfaro. This entails a discussion of
estoppel in the Cambodian-Thailand dispute. Estoppel is defined in the
opinion as a principle "which holds one who, by word or conduct willfully
causes another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and
induces him to act on the strength of that belief, as precluded from aver-
ring against that party a different state of things as existing at the, same
17. Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. 266.
18. Id at 359 (dissenting opinion).
19. Id. at 294 (dissenting opinion).
20. J. HOUSTON, LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES 160 (1956).
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time."21 Alfaro calls estoppel an Anglo-American legal concept which is
only applicable in international law in certain situations. He maintained
that in the Cambodia v. Thailand case a more suitable principle would
have been found in Spanish jurisprudence: "Spanish jurists, showing an
objective criterion, call it 'doctrina de los actos propios.' "122 Thus Alfaro
puts forth a much broader view of estoppel than that of Anglo-Saxon
jurists. As in the asylum case, Alfaro's opinion reflects a general tendency
of the Latin Americans to give more flexibility to law.
The Latin American judges of the World Court, both permanent and
ad hoc, have a record of delivering more dissenting and individual opin-
ions than have other judges. 28 They also contend that they represent a
completely unique school of thought. This is apparently not recognized
by jurists from other nations. "American international law" is deemed a
meaningless phrase, but the Latin Americans will not withdraw from the
insistence that such a system of law is a reality.
It is possible to find discussions of Latin American contributions to
international law in writings in that field of study. For example, many
textbooks devote space to a discussion of such topics as the Calvo, Estrada
and Drago doctrines, respectively. Other subjects included in these writ-
ings are special interpretations of asylum and of nonintervention. In the
field of private international law the Bustamente Code without doubt is
generally held to be an important contribution. One publicist writes:
Obviously, the division into Schools of thought is laid not on
perpendicular, but horizontal lines. This means that the dividing
lines do not separate "National" doctrines from one another
along the States' borders, placing scholars of various nations in
the same several groups of theorists throughout the world.24
Regionalism is very rarely brought up in writings in the field. The author
just quoted mentions "national doctrines" but does not tackle the problem
of regional particularism.
III. POLITICAL INSTABILITY
An explanation for the incoherence of the theory of "American in-
ternational law" may be seen in the relationship between political insta-
bility and the principles of regional particularism. The rules of interna-
tional law governing political asylum, intervention, and recognition of
governments assume importance among regional legalists by reason of the
fact that these rules are pertinent in times of political upheaval in the
Western Hemisphere. The three most widely-known theories of regional
21. Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [19621
I.C.J. 6.
22. Id. at 39.
23. See J. SYATAUW, DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1962).
24. M. KOROWiCZ, INTRODUCTION TO INTFRNATIONAL LAW 109 (1959).
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particularism, the Calvo, Estrada, and Drago doctrines, are related to
political disorders in Latin America.
The Calvo doctrine calls for adherence on the part of a resident
foreigner to the principle of local remedies, that is, the use of only local
courts in seeking justice rather than requesting his home government to
make a diplomatic claim.2" The unsettled political atmosphere of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought about intervention by
foreign governments on behalf of their citizens.26 The Calvo Clause, a
special provision written in treaties, statutes, constitutions, and agree-
ments with foreigners, attempted to prevent the diplomatic claims of
foreign nations.
The Calvo Clause is an illustration of an extreme position going be-
yond the limits of universal international law. When the Calvo Clause is
interpreted strictly, it could preclude all recourse to diplomatic claim for
the purpose of enforcing rights and is thus a departure from established
rules of international claims. One publicist explains that "it would be
tragic indeed if the nations of this hemisphere were to be recorded as the
advocates of a creed which can only operate to the prejudice of the entire
international community and to the everlasting discredit of the Pan Amer-
ican movement.1
27
In 1930 the Mexican Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada stated that
recognition of a government is automatic and that withholding of recog-
nition of a new government is an intrusion in the internal matters of a
state. The official proclamation states:
The Mexican Government is issuing no declaration in the sense
of grants of recognition, since that nation considers that such a
course is an insulting practice and one which, in addition to the
fact that it offends the sovereignty of other nations, implies that
judgment of some sort may be passed upon the internal affairs
of those nations by other governments. 2
8
The Estrada Doctrine directly attacks the United States policy of with-
holding recognition of several governments in Mexico.
Regardless of the specific events leading to the declaration, it repre-
sents an attitude among Latin American states of intolerance for the sub-
jective test for recognizing the legitimacy of a new government.2 9 It is a
sound argument that objects to the use of non-recognition as a sanction,
but the Estrada Doctrine is another example of Latin American reaction
25. See D. SHEA, T~az CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY (1955).
26. Id. at 10.
27. Freeman, Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the Challenge to International
Law, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 147 (1960).
28. Estrada Doctrine of Recognition, 25 Am. J. INT'L L. 203 (1931).
29. C. FENwIcx, INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (3d ed. 1948).
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to the foreign policies of the more powerful nations. By reason of its
radicalism, the doctrine has found no wide acceptance by scholars of in-
ternational law.
In 1902 Great Britain, Germany and Italy set up a blockade of the
Venezuelan coast in order to compel that nation to meet payment of its
debts. Dr. Luis M. Drago, then Argentine Foreign Minister, advanced a
concept which subsequently came to bear his name. Drago declared that
there can be no "oppression of peoples of this continent because an un-
fortunate financial situation may compel some one of them to postpone the
fulfillment of its promises."" Although the Roosevelt Corollary to the
Monroe Doctrine had the same aim as the Drago Doctrine (that of bar-
ring European intervention) Dr. Drago rejected Roosevelt's interpreta-
tion. Drago denounced the United States' assumption of the role of
custodian of the Western Hemisphere: "The Monroe Doctrine is in fact
a formula of independence. It imposes no dominion and no superiority.




When Dr. Drago charged the United States with attempting to estab-
lish through the Monroe Doctrine a "relation of superior to inferior" with
Latin America, he expressed the assertive character that is found in so
many rules of regional particularism. 2 The protectiveness of rules of
regional particularism is derived not only from political instability, but
also from the economic inferiority of Latin America.
From a politically and economically weak position in international
society, Hispanic-American lawyers recite broad principles of interna-
tional law, such as non-intervention and non-aggression. To the observer
outside of Latin America this reiteration of principles may seem to be
nothing more than further evidence of the prolixity of the Latin Ameri-
cans.
One Latin American statesman when questioned about certain prin-
ciples of international law stated: "I think the expressions of non-aggres-
sion and of respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations
are very beautiful and perhaps deserve their elucidation, but as far as
their ability to have what we might call moral containment, I wonder at
the efficacy."' The Latin American went on to say that "for us, the
smaller nations, those principles are even more important for the larger
nations that have and can rely on other means to defend themselves and
30. L. DRAGo, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNrTED STATES 4 (1903).
31. Id. at 51.
32. Id.
33. Velazquez, Some Legal Aspects of the Colonial Problem in Latin America, 360
ANNALs 119 (1965).
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their policies." 4 The new African and Asian states affirm almost the
identical principles supported in Latin America.85
On the protection of foreign owned property and the issue of com-
pensation for expropriated private property, Latin American states have
difficulties in meeting the demands of capital-exporting countries for a
minimum standard of treatment for foreigners. "The controversy is now
dominated by the conflict of interest that arises between the protection
of the economic investment made by nationals of the capital-exporting
countries, and the interest of the developing states in acquiring control
over their natural resources and economic development at the lowest
possible cost." 6
In summary, regional particularism comes in part from the enuncia-
tion of rules and principles of international law by Latin American jurists
in order to maintain the special interests of an economically and politi-
cally weak area of the world.
V. EFFECT OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN LATIN AMERICA
From a comparison of legal education in Latin America with that of
the Anglo-American or common law tradition, two outstanding differences
are immediately apparent. The first difference is the study of the impor-
tant legal codes of Latin American countries."7 Codification does not play
so crucial a part in legal education in common law countries. The case
approach, on the other hand, has not commended itself to law schools in
Latin America.
Secondly, in jurisprudence Latin American scholarship has remained
close to the natural law of Stoic-Thomistic philosophy while in the United
States natural law theories are not as dominant.38 The methods employed
by law faculties in the United States are viewed in Latin America as
"materialistic and positivistic."3 It is certainly true that natural law
philosophy finds a place in the origins of both the English common law
and the civil law traditions. As to the point in history when the two tradi-
tions become separate in their basic philosophies, one writer has sub-
mitted:
That basis was obscured by the rash of codification which took
place in Europe in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Guba Roy, Is the Law oj Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a
Part of Universal International Law?, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 863-91 (1961).
36. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1964).
37. See Lawson, A Common Law Lawyer Looks at Codification, 2 INTER-AM. L. REV.
(Revista Juridica Interamericana) 1-6 (1960).
38. Mayda, Problems of Legal Education in Latin America, 12 J. LEGAL ED. 416
(1959-60).
39. Brown, Recent Significant Trends in Legal Education in the Americas, 3 INTER-AM.
L. REV. (Revista Juridica Interamericana) 57 (1961).
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centuries, and reduced the European judiciary to a condition of
dependence upon the executive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment. Positivism had previously raised its head in the Eng-
lish common law world beginning with the sixteenth century.40
The universalists insist that the phrase "American international law"
is self-contradictory. They maintain that an American international law
cannot exist apart from universal international law. H. B. Jacobini points
out that the debate over "American international law" is largely termino-
logical and that "virtually all of the writers agree that there exists an
element of continental solidarity which includes a few peculiarly Ameri-
can rules, practices, and problems, and that America has contributed
much to international law in general. ' 4' Thus one might describe the con-
cept of a body of American international law as the unique contributions
of the Western Hemisphere to general international law. Even Alvarez
admits this when he says that "certain jurists have sought to call this
complex the 'peculiarities of international law in America.' This is merely
a question of terminology. '' 42 Nevertheless, debate continues on the
existence or non-existence of hemispheric particularism in international
law. Whatever the derivations of regional particularism may be, one
would expect that Latin American judges who are members of an inter-
national tribunal would be proper spokesmen for their legal system.
40. Id. at 61.
41. H. JACOBINi, A STUDY OF THE PHIOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SEEN IN
WORKS OF LATiN AmER AN WRITERS 155 (1954). See also C. SEPULVEDA, CUrso D Da-
RECHO INTERNACIONAL PuBLiCO 273-75 (1964).
42. 'Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. 266 at 294 (dissenting opinion of
Alvarez).
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